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IaaSAbstract Threats jeopardize some basic security requirements in a cloud. These threats generally
constitute privacy breach, data leakage and unauthorized data access at different cloud layers. This
paper presents a novel multilevel classification model of different security attacks across different
cloud services at each layer. It also identifies attack types and risk levels associated with different
cloud services at these layers. The risks are ranked as low, medium and high. The intensity of these
risk levels depends upon the position of cloud layers. The attacks get more severe for lower layers
where infrastructure and platform are involved. The intensity of these risk levels is also associated
with security requirements of data encryption, multi-tenancy, data privacy, authentication and
authorization for different cloud services. The multilevel classification model leads to the provision
of dynamic security contract for each cloud layer that dynamically decides about security require-
ments for cloud consumer and provider.
 2016 King Saud University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a broad paradigm based on models for
providing services of storage and platform software. Cloud
computing concept has emerged from distributed and grid
computing domains that are already in use for mail servers,
web storage and hosting services. Cloud computing, as defined
by NIST, is referred to as: A model for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, stor-
age, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provi-
der interaction [1].
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layers, i.e., SaaS (Software as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a
Service) and IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service). Although appli-
cations for clouds are in development phase, however security
requirements for the data and services on the clouds are getting
attention of researchers and it has become necessary to con-
sider each layer of a cloud for possible attacks. It is worth not-
ing that cloud computing systems have many advantages;
however, large organizations are still hesitant to shift their set-
ups on the cloud mainly due to security issues and risks. Thus,
it is important to address the security issues and problems in
cloud systems, and to find a solution for the widespread accep-
tance of these solutions. However, being a new domain, the
research on the requirements and issues regarding security of
clouds is still in its early stages.
In the literature, there are different classifications of cloud
security attacks [2–7] targeting a specific cloud service or a par-
ticular kind of the cloud system. Thus there is a need for a
more comprehensive classification of security attacks across
versatile cloud services at each layer. This paper proposes a
multilevel classification of security attacks for different cloud
services and their associated risks at cloud layers. It also dis-
cusses provision of dynamic security contract for each cloud
layer that dynamically decides about security requirements
for cloud consumer and provider.
The rest of paper is structured as follows: Section 2 consists
of related work. Section 3 presents the proposed multilevel
classification of security concerns in cloud computing. Sec-
tion 4 is based on the dynamic security contract concept. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.2. Related work
The application softwares at SaaS are provided with a specific
license based subscription, pay-as-go [8]. Platform as a Service
(PaaS) caters services for operating system, network capacity,
storage and multi-tenancy via the Internet. Infrastructure as a
service (IaaS) provides utility computing, automation of
administrative tasks, dynamic scaling, desktop virtualization,
policy-based services, and Internet connectivity. IaaS provides
virtual servers with unique IP address and storage pool as
required by customers. The concept of infrastructure and hard-
ware layer is mentioned by different researchers. Some authors
have suggested that the infrastructure layer offers system soft-
ware services and hardware layer provides hardware-based ser-
vices. Infrastructure and hardware layers may be combined
due to intrinsic relationship between hardware and software.
In [9], security aspects of one of the popular cloud Amazon
Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) have been discussed. It consists
of systematic analysis of various crucial vulnerabilities in pub-
licly available Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) and mecha-
nisms to eliminate them. The proposed tool referred to as
Amazon Image Attacks (AmazonIA) uses only publicly avail-
able interfaces regardless of the underlying cloud infrastruc-
ture. As a result of exploiting vulnerabilities and successful
attacks, authors are able to extract sensitive information
including passwords, and credentials from AMIs. The
extracted information can be used to initiate botnets, or create
back doors to launch impersonate attacks or access source
code of a web service available on AMI. The authors have dis-
cussed effects of successful attacks and also the methods tomitigate those attacks. Some research groups have worked
on the interfaces of both public and private clouds [10]. The
public cloud under their consideration is Amazon, while the
private cloud is Eucalyptus.
Authors in [11] consider security as a service for cloud-
based applications. The architecture considers the existing ser-
vices at different levels. It considers user-centric security i.e.,
users have control over their security permitting them to use
security solutions across different clouds. They can subscribe
to any security solution provided by any cloud provider and
use that particular security solution for their cloud and may
also have multiple security solutions for a particular service
depending upon its criticality. The multiple security solutions
can also be used at different levels.
Authors in [9] address the security and privacy aspects of
real-life cloud deployments, while ignoring the malicious cloud
providers or customers. Here authors’ focus is Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2). They have analyzed the crucial vulner-
abilities of Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) through an auto-
mated tool and as a result of attack information regarding API
Keys, private keys and credentials of publishers were extracted
[9]. Vulnerabilities were discovered in Secure Shell. The
extracted information can be further used to create multiple
security threats resulting in botnet instances, access of backend
services or code of the Web sites through back-doors content.
In [12] authors suggest that security should be provided as a
service and propose a model for security as service. Security as
a service implies that the security applications and services can
be provided by a cloud vendor, or cloud consumer or even by a
third trust-worthy party. The security service can be in the
form of a cloud-based infrastructure or software. The authors
have proposed a component based software model in which
authorization components can be developed by any party
regardless of being a service provider. An eXtensible access
control markup language (XACML) decision engine that is
composed of a context handler, a policy decision point and a
policy administration point, can be furnished by reusable com-
ponents to augment the security service. By XACML standard
attributes of subjects, resources and environments and autho-
rization rules can be defined as Boolean expressions. Thus,
these types of security services, which can be managed and
altered by cloud customers, are helpful to build trust of cloud
customers on cloud systems.
In [3] Cloud Computing OpenArchitecture (CCOA) concept
is discussed for clouds in virtual environments. The role and
functions of the architecture are discussed according to different
infrastructures for IT and business systems. Different types of
architectures complicate security management for cloud sys-
tems. This architecture provides a solution for different security
aspects regarding virtual environments. The authors suggest
physical and logical isolation of data instances for each customer
to enhance the data privacy and expeditious replication and
recovery system. Authorized users based on the role-based
access control can access the sensitive data on platforms. To pre-
vent intrusion attacks, cloud service provider blocks the mali-
cious andun-trusted codes enabling digital forensic applications.
Research in [14] suggests a trusted computing and attesta-
tion system for virtual environments. In virtual environments
systems are more prone to threats due to the poor computer
communication architectures and hidden network channels.
These hidden channels can be a risk since many virtualized net-
work channels can be easily observed and hacked.
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computing
Cloud systems have a layered architecture of different services
and control levels for users. Fig. 1 illustrates the classification
model of security problems at each layer of the cloud system.
SaaS, PaaS and IaaS layers are considered for associated secu-
rity risks and problems.
3.1. Security concerns for Software as a Service (SaaS)
SaaS is exposed by attacks on API’s, publishers, web portals
and interfaces. The attacks on the SaaS are categorized into
two broad groups: attacks on development tools and attacks
on management tools. Most popular services on SaaS are
web services, web portals and APIs. Intruders’ attempt un-
authorized access and gain of services by attacking web portals
and APIs. These attacks affect data privacy. Intruders try to
extract the sensitive information of API Keys, private keys,
and credentials of publishers via different kinds of attacks
and automated tools. Another possibility of attack on this
layer is exposure of secure shell for extracting key credentials.
3.1.1. Data protection
In cloud computing applications are deployed in shared
resource environments; therefore, data privacy is an important
aspect. Data privacy has three major challenges: integrity,
authorized access and availability (backup/ replication). Data
integrity ensures that the data are not corrupted or tampered
during communication. Authorized access prevents data from
intrusion attacks while backups and replicas allow data access
efficiently even in case of a technical fault or disaster at some
cloud location. Data are shared and communicated at the
common network backbone. Hence malicious attackers or
intruders can deploy hidden proxy applications between theFigure 1 Classification model of attackcloud provider and consumer to scavenge information of login
credentials and session details [4]. An intruder can also per-
form packet sniffing or IP-spoofing as a middle-party and
can access and/or alter the restricted or sensitive information.
One possible solution for the data privacy in cloud computing
is Cisco Secure Data Center Framework that provides multi-
layer security mechanism [4].
3.1.2. Attacks on interfaces
A successful attack on the cloud interfaces can result in a root
level access of a machine without initiating a direct attack on
the cloud infrastructure. Two different kinds of attacks are
launched on authentication mechanism of clouds. The control
interfaces are vulnerable to signature wrapping and advanced
cross site scripting (XSS) techniques. First kind of attack is
referred to as signature wrapping attack or XML Signature
Wrapping attacks. Single signed SOAP message or X.509 cer-
tificate can be used to compromise security of customers?
accounts through operations on virtual machines or resetting
of passwords. Second type of attacks exploits the vulnerability
in XSS. The particular vulnerability attack steals username
and password pair information.
3.1.3. Attacks on SSH (Secure Shell)
Attacks on Secure Shell (SSH), the basic mechanism used to
establish trust and connection with cloud services, are the most
alarming threat that compromises control trust. According to
Ponemon 2014 SSH security Vulnerability Report [15], 74 per-
cent organizations have no control to provision, rotate, track
and remove SSH keys. Cybercriminals take full advantage of
these vulnerabilities and use cloud computing to launch differ-
ent attacks. An organizations´ cloud workload can be used host
botnets if SSH access has been compromised. Attackers have
hosted the Zeus botnet and control infrastructure on Amazon
EC2 instances [16]. The different types of attack on SSHs at each layer of the cloud system.
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attacks on publisher credentials.
3.2. Security concerns for Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and
Platform as a Service (PaaS)
IaaS and PaaS layers are overlapped in the model due to their
interdependency on each other. The attacks on these layers are
grouped into three types: attacks on cloud services, attacks on
virtualization, and attacks on utility computing. The security
concerns for IaaS and PaaS are discussed below.
3.2.1. Hardware virtualization
The VMs interconnectivity is the biggest security concern in
the designing of cloud computing platform. VMs are linked
using bridge and route virtual network configuration modes.
The bridge mode works as a virtual hub shared among all
the VMs, which may result in sniffing the virtual network by
a compromised VM. In the route mode, where route works
as a virtual switch, each VM is connected using a dedicated vir-
tual interface. Any network intruder in a LAN segment of a
network can access virtual environments by address resolution
protocol (ARP) spoofing and MAC spoofing. ARP spoofing
alters the ARP tables and management interfaces and systems.
On the other hand, an intruder can mimic another host
through MAC spoofing and also change address of host or
guest Virtual Machine (VM) to gain access of restricted
resources [13]. The attacks and exploitation of virtual environ-
ments are very diversified and they will increase in future since
platforms are growing in number and complexity. Therefore, a
mechanism for detecting attacks along with preventions is
necessary.
3.2.2. Software virtualization
A software virtualization attack may examine the VM images
to launch an attack or steal of information, especially targeting
development images, which are accidentally released [21]. It is
also possible to provide a VM image having malware to cloud
computing system resulting in theft and corruption of data.
For example, cloud consumers are enticed to run tainted
VM images contributed to image repository manipulating
the registration process for first page listing.
3.2.3. Cloud softwares
Multi-tenancy in clouding computing requires multiplexing the
execution of VMs from different consumer on the same phys-
ical server [17]. Softwares deployed on guest VM remain sus-
ceptible to attack and compromise. A malicious code in VM
may interfere with the hypervisor or other VMs. Shortcomings
in programming interfaces and processing of instructions are
the main targets to uncover vulnerabilities [18]. This security
concern also includes indirect attacks such as man-in-the-
middle during a live VM migration; insertion VM based root-
kit during memory modification; a zero-day exploit in
HyperVM; side-channel attack to gain information.
3.2.4. Utility computing
Utility computing is the concept that emerged from grid com-
puting, and it combines computation, storage and bandwidth
to provide services on the demand through payment by thecustomer. It also provides two basic advantages of cost reduc-
tion and scalability. Security risk associated with utility com-
puting is access by attackers who want to utilize resources
without paying [8]. Majority of hackers and crackers use the
computing power or storage for the illegal use. The common
use of public cloud includes e-commerce, web-application
and Web site hosting making these services vulnerable to vari-
ety of attacks on possession, authenticity, integrity and utility.
A compromised client may perform a Fraudulent Resource
Consumption (FRC) attack by using the metered bandwidth
of web-based service that results in a financial burden on the
cloud consumer [19].
3.2.5. Service Level Agreement (SLA)
SLA is an optimal way for ensuring security and trust. The
implementation of SLA results in a well-designed contract of
responsibilities between parties that can enhance security level.
In cloud environment, SLA can be combined with the web ser-
vice level agreement (WSLA) for mitigating security risks [8].
SLA defines the different levels of security and their complex-
ity based on the services for the better understanding of the
security policies to a cloud consumer. The existing cloud stor-
age systems do not provide security guarantees in their SLAs
effecting the adaptation of cloud services. A cloud storage ser-
vice may leak private data, return inconsistent data or modify
the data due to bugs, hacking, crashes, or misconfigurations.
This security concerns require proper SLA guarantee models
such as CloudProof [20].
Table 1 shows multilevel classification for the three cloud
layers in terms of cloud service, types of attack, cloud type
and risk levels. Cloud layers are considered as first level fol-
lowed by cloud services as second level and types of attacks
for these services as third. A risk is associated with each level
of this classification. SaaS has low to medium risk level if it
is under attack. However attacks on publisher service at this
layer may adversely affect the services. Services at PaaS and
IaaS layers are associated with medium to high risks.
The classification identifies the risk levels as low (less vulner-
able), medium, and high (more vulnerable) depending on the
exposure of cloud security requirements. Data encryption,
multi-tenancy, data privacy, authentication, and authorization
are the security requirements for cloud services. The exposure
of these security requirements constitutes different risk levels.
For example exposure of multi-tenancy and data privacy for
hardware virtualization represents high risk. These levels indi-
cate control of a customer given by a service over the cloud sys-
tem. The attacks on software layer are generally considered less
severe and if the attack effects infrastructure or platform layers
it has medium to high severity. However it is observed that cer-
tain attacks such as attacks on SSH for publisher credentials on
software layer are highly adverse. A cloud service offered at
PaaS or IaaS provides multiple ways for the exposure of cloud
system. From this, it may be inferred that major attacks and
threats exist on the underlying layers of a cloud system.
At second level available services on PaaS and IaaS consti-
tute hardware virtualization, software virtualization, utility
computing and development services. Some attacks on these
services may be severe up to the extent that even the real
machines can be affected. Most of intruders try to hack these
layers with the help of ARP spoofing, MAC spoofing or exe-
cuting malicious codes on cloud platforms.
Table 1 A multi-level classification of security and privacy risk in cloud computing.
Cloud layer Cloud service Security concerns Attack type Cloud type Risk
SAAS Web service Data protection Privacy All clouds Medium
Web portal Attack on interfaces Attack on signature AMI/EC2 Low
Attacks on credentials AMI/EC3 Medium
API Attack on SSH Attack on API Keys AMI/EC4 Medium
Attack on user credentials AMI/EC5 Medium
Attack on publisher credentials AMI/EC6 High
PAAS and IAAS Platform virtualization Hardware virtualization ARP Spoofing on virtual switching All High
MAC spoogin on virtual switching All Medium
Software virtualization Hacking on computations All Low
Development services Cloud softwares Malicious code script All High
Computation services Utility computing Unpaid client attacks All Low
SLA Hacking All High
Table 2 A mapping of cloud service and security requirements.
Data encryption Multi-tenancy Data privacy Authentication Authorization
Security requirements
Data protection Yes No Yes No No
API’s No No No Yes Yes
Web portals No No No Yes Yes
Cloud software Yes No Yes No Yes
HardWare virtualization No Yes Yes No No
Software virtualization No Yes No No Yes
Virtualization No Yes No No Yes
Utility computing No Yes No No Yes
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tion or to get signatures and user credentials. Attacks on SSH
(Secure SHell) extract API keys, user credentials and publisher
credentials. Attacks for breaking encryption, extracting signa-
tures, keys, and credentials are associated with low to medium
level risks. However attack on publisher credentials has high-
level risk. Hardware virtualization is attacked through ARP
spoofing and MAC spoofing. Risk level associated with hard-
ware virtualization is medium to high. Software virtualization
is threatened by hacking with automated tools and has a high
level of risk. Malicious codes and scripts can be executed with
development services and these may adversely affect the whole
cloud system, and hence risk associated with development ser-
vices is high. Utility computing is associated with high risk
level and can be attacked by hacking or for SLA.
Table 2 presents a mapping of cloud services and cloud
security requirements. The mentioned security requirements
are mandatory to achieve the integrity and coherence in the
cloud system. These security requirements are data encryption,
multi-tenancy, data privacy, authentication, and authoriza-
tion. Data encryption and hashing techniques are used to pro-
tect the data over the distributed system. Thus, the data
protection service depends on encryption techniques and pri-
vacy policies. If data protection services or web services are
attacked, the data encryption and data privacy will be compro-
mised because intruder will try to break encryption and hash-
ing policies. However physical data storage is not threatened
so risk factor associated is medium. On the other hand, if
API’s and web portals are intruded, authentication and autho-
rization requirements will be violated. API’s and web portalsprovide a gateway to access cloud systems, thus by attacking
these gateways, attackers can easily expose cloud systems.
However these credentials and signatures are expired after
the session so risk factor associated with these services is low
to medium. Development services provide a way to create
other cloud services by customers. By accessing this service,
malicious scripts and codes can be executed. Attacks on devel-
opment services can expose the data encryption, multi-tenancy
and authentication. So this service has a high risk factor. Vir-
tualization offers many advantages but these advantages are
associated with the possibility of some threats e.g., multiple
numbers of customers on a single resource can access data in
an un-authorized manner. Intrusion on hardware virtualiza-
tion may violate multi-tenancy requirement and data privacy
and has a high risk factor. If software virtualization and utility
computing are attacked, multi-tenancy and authorization are
threatened. Attacks on multi-tenancy jeopardize the logical
separation of multiple customers on a single resource, and
hence risk factor is high.
4. Dynamic security provisioning
Dynamic Security Contract (DSC) between a cloud consumer
and a provider is implemented across the layers according to
consumer and provider requirements for services and security.
Security gets more stringent for the services offered at cloud
provider layers (PaaS and IaaS). The risk levels associated with
these two layers are in the medium to high range since the
attacks on the services of these layers may affect the whole
cloud system. Hence level of security is determined dynami-
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shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 shows that the service X1 and X2 at SaaS layer has a
specific risks R, such as attacks on APIs, attacks on interfaces,
attacks on publisher, and data protection, having severity
levels such as low, medium and high. DSC takes this informa-
tion as input to prepare the security services at PaaS and IaaS.
The service, X1 and X2, requested by a cloud consumer in for-
warded to PaaS to allocate platform service PS1 along with the
necessary security services is defined by DSC. IaaS layer pro-
vides suitable infrastructure service IS1 for PS1 along with
the required security services.
DSC defines the risk levels associated with each service. The
DSC is constituted by X, S, A where X is the service, S is secu-
rity expected/required, and A is the type of attack. In symbolic
form DSA can be written as
DSCðX;S;AÞ ! R ð1Þ
where R is the risk level associated with a particular DSC.
DSC is provisioned when a cloud service is requested by a con-
sumer. The DSC for this request will identify security require-
ments for this particular service and classify the risk levels
associated with the service demanded by the consumer. The
risk levels change dynamically depending on the type of the
service and possible attacks associated with that service. The
outcome of this dynamic security assessment is decisionFigure 2 Dynamic security provisionregarding the level and type of security required for the risk.
Eq. (1) for multiple services and different attack types
becomes:
DSC X;
X
S;
X
A
 
! R ð2Þ
Following example illustrates the concept behind Eqs. (1) and
(2). The example shows subset of web portal services and hard-
ware virtualization consisting of possibilities of attacks and
security services of authentication, authorization, multi-
tenancy and data privacy. It is important to observe that risk
level changes to high as cloud service changes to hardware vir-
tualization from web portal. Hence security service dynami-
cally switches over to multi-tenancy and data privacy.
Example:
Possible Subset for Web Portal
X=Web portal, S=Authentication, A=Attacks on Sig-
natures, R = Low
X=Web portal, S=Authentication, A=Attacks on cre-
dentials, R = Medium
X=Web portal, S1 = Authentication, S2 = Authoriza-
tion, A = Attacks on credentials, R = Medium
X=Web portal, S1 = Authentication, S2 = Authoriza-
tion, A1 = Attacks on Signatures, A2 = Attacks on creden-
tials, R = Mediumacross layers of the cloud system.
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X=Hardware Virtualization, S1 = Multi-tenancy, S2 =
Data Privacy, A1 = ARP spoofing, R = High.
X=Hardware Virtualization, S1 = Multi-tenancy, S2 =
Data Privacy, A1 = MAC spoofing, R = High.
X=Hardware Virtualization, S1 = Multi-tenancy, S2 =
Data Privacy, A1 = ARP spoofing, A2= MAC spoofing,
R = High.
4.1. Dynamic Security Contract (DSC) provisioning model
DSC is an approach for agreement between a consumer and a
provider regarding cross layer security provisioning methods
corresponding to the available services. Before establishing
the security model, it is necessary to understand the different
objectives and outcomes of DSC from consumer as well as
provider perspective.
Fig. 3 shows the flow of our proposed Dynamic Security
Contract (DSC) in which the consumer is offered a DSC after
initial contact to the provider. The consumer can have three
available options, accept the DSC as it is, negotiate the param-
eters as per his requirements or decline the DSC without giving
any reason. The provider responds to either of the choices with
its own viable set of corresponding options, i.e. Provision of
security if accepted by consumer, alter the DSC keeping in
view of its own parameters of cost and Return on investment
(ROI) or decline any further contact. The consumer can now
either accept or decline the new offer as there is only one avail-
able option for negotiation to simplify the model, and provider
responds with provisioning security or declining the consumer
choices. Consumer and provider have their own set of param-
eters to decide the viability of the contract and are discussed in
further sections with the foremost discussion on measurement
of security in a quantifiable manner.
4.1.1. Security measurement metrics
Each threat t 2 T is associated with a set of vulnerabilities and
to represent attack we extend the notation of [22] to establish a
Cloud Attack Graph (CAG). Each CAG is a tuple CAG=(V,
E) where V ¼ Nc [Nd [Nr and E is set of directed edgesFigure 3 Dynamicbetween any members of V. Each node Sc 2 Nc is defined as
a tuple (Service, Vulnerability). Each node belonging to Nd is
the outcome of exploiting vulnerability in the corresponding
service. For each attack step node Sc 2 Nc the probability of
vulnerability exploitation at any given time is denoted by Pr
[e], which can be assigned according to the Base Score (BS) cal-
culated from CVSS [23]. The value of BS ranges from 0 to 10
and Pr[e] can be derived as
Pr½e ¼ BS Sc
10
 
; 8Sc 2 Nc ð3Þ
In an attack graph the vulnerabilities are related to each other
through their dependency conditions [24], and thus the proba-
bility of an exploit can be calculated according to its relation
with its predecessor and their risk probabilities. Given a set
of predecessor nodes x as parents for node Sc 2 Nc, the condi-
tional risk probability can be given as
PrðScjxÞ ¼ Pr½e 
Y
y2x
PrðyjxÞ ð4Þ
once the conditional probabilities are assigned, the cumulative
risk probability for effective mitigation and remediation plan
against each threat can be calculated as
PrðScÞ ¼ PrðScjxÞ 
Y
y2x
PrðyÞ ð5Þ4.1.2. DSC offering
The cumulative risk calculated in the previous section is used
to effectively select the corresponding countermeasure from
the set of mitigation plan pool. The mitigation plan is a set
MP={mp1;mp2;mp3; . . . ;mpn} where each mp is a tuple m
p=(condition,effort,effectiveness,cost), where condition is the
exploit that must hold a true value, effort is the struggle
required to implement the mitigation plan, effectiveness is
the probabilistic measure of guarantee in case of applying
the specific plan and cost is the expense incurred in its imple-
mentation. The return on investment from provider perspec-
tive can be given by
ROI½t;mp ¼ benefit½t;mp
mp:costþmp:effort ð6Þsecurity contract.
Table 3 DSC from consumer/provider perspective.
Consumer Provider
Security of data as per information requirements (i.e. sensitivity) with minimum cost and
maximum utilization
– Demand sufficient security
– Min (Risk)
– Min (Cost)
– Max (Utilization)
– Max (ROI)
Provision of security at every layer of cloud
– Risk assessment and countermeasure
selection
– Opt-able security choices
– Meet dynamic SLAs
– Avoid penalties
– Max (ROI)
64 S.A. Hussain et al.where benefit is the change in the probability of exploitation of
the given node after applying a mitigation plan, given by
benefit½t;mp ¼ prðeÞ ¼ DprðeÞ  ðmp:effectivenessÞ ð7Þ
Possible choices for mitigation plan and their respective cost
benefit analysis from the provider perspective are crucial in
offering dynamic security contracts and their negotiations.
The objective of /Volumes/Macintosh HD 2/Research/Mul-
tilevel security concerns cloud computing/LaTex/Multilevel
security classification/Supplementary.texMAX (ROI), MAX
(SLA) andMIN (penalties) for provider can be achieved once
the maximum and minimum costs for countermeasure are
known for each threat. Effectiveness and Cost are two param-
eters delivered to the consumer in the DSC. Optimal selection
of mitigation plan and countermeasure selection is related to
the information classification and definition of acceptable
security at consumer end.
4.1.3. DSC selection
A consumer c 2 C opts to use at least one service x 2 X from
the provider P at any layer of cloud with no limit on maximum
number. Thus there exists a many-to-many relation between
consumers and services. For simplicity, we will be considering
each service independently in the context of a single consumer.
Sufficient security is said to be achieved when the consumer
data residing/ transiting cloud service is safe from threat or
the risk has been accepted as inevitable by the consumer. We
assume that the information is classified and the respective
security level is translated into numeric values that scale from
0 to 10 with 0 as least restricted requiring no security and 10 as
the most restricted information level requiring stringent secu-
rity measures. Mapping of security requirements, effectiveness
of countermeasure and cost leads to the decision of adopting,
negotiating or declining a DSC. Given the information protec-
tion level, the return on investment (ROI) for adopting a DSC,
for a service x 2 X with threat vector aA and offered security
s 2 S with effectiveness e and cost c must be greater than or
equal to 1 (see Table 3).
TOI½dsc; p ¼ p s:effectiveness
s:cost
ð8Þ
DSCðx; a; s; e; cÞ ¼
accept; ROI > 1
negotiate; ROI ¼ 1
decline; ROI < 1
8><
>:5. Conclusion
A novel multilevel classification of security concerns in cloud
computing highlighting the effect of different security attackson each cloud layer is presented in this paper. This multilevel
classification provides a new dimension to address security
concerns on multiple levels and minimization of their effects.
The level of severity of the attack is also assessed as low, med-
ium and high across different security concerns. The security
requirements for different cloud services are also outlined for
the secure cloud computing. These security requirements
include data encryption, multi-tenancy, data privacy, authenti-
cation and authorization. These security requirements are
mapped to different cloud services to achieve integrity and
coherence in the cloud system. The paper presents a novel con-
cept of dynamic security contract to determine the risk level
and type of security required for each service at different cloud
layers for a cloud consumer and cloud provider.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found,
in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aci.2016.
03.001.
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